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Abstract
Th e author examines Guideline 7 – Concerning Prepara-
tion and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection 
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board. She cri-
tiques the use of the fettering of discretion doctrine when 
it is applied to procedural guidelines. She argues that it is 
based on a false ontology about the nature of rules and 
guidelines. She also critiques the use of the fettering of in-
dependence doctrine when applied to procedural guidelines 
aimed at enhancing the expediency, rather than consistency, 
of decision making. Her main argument is that Guideline 7 
does not impede, per se, the ability of RPD members to de-
cide according to their own conscience and opinion.
Résumé
L’auteure examine la Directive 7 – Concernant la prépa-
ration et la conduite d’audience devant la Division de la 
protection des réfugiés. Elle critique l’usage de la doctrine 
de l’entrave à la discrétion lorsqu’elle est appliquée à des di-
rectives procédurales.  Elle argumente qu’elle est basée sur 
une fausse ontologie sur la nature des règles et des directives. 
Elle critique aussi l’usage de la doctrine de l’entrave à l’indé-
pendance lorsqu’elle est appliquée à des directives procédu-
rales qui ont pour fonction d’accroître la célérité, plutôt que 
la cohérence, du processus décisionnel.  Son principal argu-
ment est que la Directive 7 n’aff ecte pas, en soi, la capacité 
des membres du tribunal de décider selon leur conscience et 
opinion.
Introduction
Few purely adjudicative administrative tribunals use policy 
instruments such as guidelines to confi ne or structure their 
board members’ discretion. Th e main concern with the use 
of such instruments is that they may negatively interfere with 
independence and impartiality of decision makers. But not 
all administrative tribunals share this concern. In Canada, 
the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB or Board) has 
been very creative in its usage of a variety of policy instru-
ments since its inception in 1989. Besides four sets of rules 
of procedure and practice, the Chairperson has issued eight 
guidelines, two jurisprudential guides, six persuasive deci-
sions, thirteen policies, two instructions, and nine policy 
notes.1 In this paper, I will examine one of the IRB’s guide-
lines: Guideline 7 – Concerning Preparation and Conduct of 
a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division (Guideline 7).2 
Th e reason for studying this guideline is because it is one 
of the most controversial policy instruments issued by the 
IRB. Although its validity was challenged in courts and the 
Federal Court of Appeal resolved the litigation in 2007 in fa-
vour of the IRB, this guideline is still the subject of much 
discussion in refugee circles.
Guideline 7 is a case management policy instrument. It is a 
procedural guideline which aims to enhance the expediency 
of the decision-making process of the Refugee Protection 
Division (RPD). As stated by the IRB in the text of Guideline 
7, its main purpose is to make the best use of hearing time by 
the RPD. In fact, the IRB was, and still is, very preoccupied 
with the backlog of refugee claims. It has been a major prob-
lem for the Board since its early days and Guideline 7 is one 
of the tools which is part of the IRB action plan to increase 
the Board’s effi  ciency in this regard.3
Section 3 of Guideline 7 contains the guideline at the heart 
of litigation. Paragraph 19 changes the order of questioning 
by having the RPD leading the inquiry in the hearing room:
In a claim for refugee protection, the standard practice 
will be for the RPO [Refugee Protection Offi  cer4] to start 
questioning the claimant. If there is no RPO participating in 
the hearing, the member will begin, followed by counsel for 
the claimant. Beginning the hearing in this way allows the 
claimant to quickly understand what evidence the member 
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needs from the claimant in order for the claimant to prove 
his or her case.
Th is new procedure has come to be known as “reverse or-
der questioning.” It is now the standard practice in front of 
the RPD. With this new procedural setting, claims are pro-
cessed in the following manner: Th e RPD member assigned 
to a case makes a preliminary identifi cation of the issues she 
considers to be problematic and central to the claim. Th is 
identifi cation is based on the information disclosed by the 
claimant in his Personal Information Form.5 Th ereaft er, the 
RPD member is required to fi ll in a File Screening Form 
identifying those issues in writing and to provide a copy of 
the form to the claimant with the notice to appear. At the 
hearing, the RPD (member or RPO) will start questioning 
the claimant on those issues identifi ed in the File Screening 
Form, aft er which the claimant will be given the possibility of 
completing or correcting his answers to the questions previ-
ously asked by the RPD. In sum, the claimant can no longer 
tell his whole story during the hearing, unless he is success-
ful in his application to vary the order of questioning under 
paragraph 23 of Guideline 7.6 When an application to vary 
the order is allowed, the hearing will proceed the way it used 
to in most cases before Guideline 7 was issued. A claimant 
will present his case fi rst and be questioned thereaft er by the 
RPD.
Although Guideline 7 became operational on 1 December 
2003, paragraph 19 became eff ective only on 1 June 2004, 
and from this date until 25 May 2007, Toronto-based claim-
ants (for the most part) objected to the reverse order ques-
tioning procedure. Th eir view was that Guideline 7 was in-
valid because it violated the principles of procedural fairness 
and fettered RPD members’ discretion. During this period 
of time, RPD members usually rejected this objection until 
several counsels for claimants decided to challenge the valid-
ity of these RPD decisions and Guideline 7 in front of the 
Federal Court. In 2006, two contradictory decisions emerged: 
Th amotharem7 and Benitez.8
In January 2006, Mr. Th amotharem’s application for judi-
cial review was granted by Justice Blanchard of the Federal 
Court, who quashed the RPD’s decision on the basis that 
Guideline 7 was an invalid fetter on the RPD members’ 
discretion in the conduct of the hearing. However, Justice 
Blanchard rejected the applicant’s allegation that Guideline 7 
violated the principles of procedural fairness. In April 2006, 
Mr. Benitez’s application for judicial review was dismissed by 
Justice Mosley of the Federal Court. Justice Mosley agreed 
with Blanchard J. that Guideline 7 did not violate the princi-
ples of natural justice, but he disagreed with his colleague on 
the issue that Guideline 7 fettered Board members’ discretion. 
Both decisions were appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal. 
Justice Evans dismissed the appeals.9 According to his ruling, 
Guideline 7 did not violate the principles of natural justice 
nor did it fetter RPD members’ discretion in the conduct of 
the hearing. Applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Court were fi led and dismissed on 13 December 2007.10
Of the two main issues raised in both levels of courts, I 
will focus on examining the reasons on the fettering of dis-
cretion doctrine. I will focus on this issue because the legal 
parameters surrounding the power of public authorities, and 
administrative tribunals in particular, to issue guidelines and 
other policy instruments are underdeveloped in administra-
tive law. Most notably, there is very little nuance in case law 
between the nature and purpose of guidelines which results 
in a linear application of the fettering of discretion doctrine 
to all guidelines without distinction. Th is is precisely the 
issue that this paper addresses. But before discussing it in 
more detail, it is necessary to briefl y explain the problems 
raised by the fettering of discretion doctrine.
1. Fettering of Discretion Doctrine
Th e doctrine of fettering discretion tackles a classical prob-
lem in administrative law concerning the scope of discre-
tionary powers. More precisely, the doctrine fi xes the outer 
boundary of what a public authority ought not to do when 
exercising its discretionary powers. It ought not to transform 
its power to choose to exercise discretion in a particular way 
into a duty to compel a decision maker to exercise his discre-
tion in a particular way.
Th e idea that a guideline cannot be mandatory is closely 
linked to a concept of legal norms: that there is a sharp dis-
tinction between “rules” and “discretion.” Rules regulate the 
conduct of individuals and are enforced by public authorities. 
Legal rules are characterized as hard and mandatory. Th eir 
validity is assessed through the lenses of their conformity 
with the legal powers to make delegated legislation granted 
to that authority: “Is the rule intra or ultra vires?” Th is is a 
question engaging an interpretative exercise.
Discretionary powers are understood as the antithesis 
to rules as public authorities are entitled to make choices to 
determine the best course of action on a case-by-case basis. 
Contrary to rules, discretionary powers are characterized as 
soft  and fl exible. Unlike rule-making powers, discretionary 
powers are conferred with a variable, yet relative, degree of 
broadness, which makes the interpretation of their scope a 
far more diffi  cult and fuzzy exercise to accomplish, with un-
certain results on the excess of jurisdiction ground of review. 
Th erefore, and more oft en than not, when public authorities 
exercise their discretion, the validity of their actions is as-
sessed, not under the excess of jurisdiction ground of re-
view, but under specifi c grounds better adapted to this type 
of power and classifi ed under “abuse of discretionary pow-
ers.” Under this ground, the judicial inquiry focuses on the 
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facts identifi ed by public authorities to exercise their judg-
ment. Discretion is abused when, for example, its exercise 
is based on improper purposes, irrelevant considerations, or 
bad faith.
However, as D. Mullan points out, as well as the Supreme 
Court in Baker, there “is no bright line distinction between 
exercising discretion and engaging in interpretation.”11 Th is 
statement is even truer when the validity of guidelines is 
under scrutiny for they are issued to put some normative 
constraints on the exercise of discretion. From this perspec-
tive, “rules” and “guidelines” share common characteristics 
which, in turn, raise the question of statutory jurisdiction to 
issue norms in the form of guidelines. But again, the inter-
pretative exercise can oft en be inconclusive as guidelines do 
not need to be explicitly authorized by statute.12
In the legal literature, Carver wrote a paper entirely dedi-
cated to Th amotharem and Benitez and discussed the prob-
lem of statutory jurisdiction to issue guidelines by asking 
the following question:13 What is the legal signifi cance of 
statutory authorization of non-binding guidelines? To an-
swer his question, Carver points out fi rstly that s. 159(1)
(h) of the IRPA confers to the Chairperson of the Board the 
power to issue guidelines to assist members in carrying out 
their duties. To his view, this power “appears to express the 
clear intention of Parliament to enhance the power of the 
IRB Chairperson to direct the Board’s adjudicative activ-
ities.” However, he further argues that this does not neces-
sarily equate to a power to make subordinate legislation. Th is 
is correct, and in fact this interpretation is foreclosed by the 
IRPA. Indeed, s. 93 expressly states that: “[ … ] guidelines 
issued by the Chairperson under paragraph 159(1)(h) are 
not statutory instruments for the purposes of the Statutory 
Instruments Act.” Nonetheless, his question is important be-
cause the Supreme Court decided in 1978 in Capital Cities 
Communications that administrative tribunals have an im-
plied authority to adopt non-binding policy statements.14 
However, because this decision was taken in the context of 
a policy statement adopted by a regulatory agency, that is to 
say the CRTC, the issue remains open as to whether all types 
of administrative tribunals should, on the one hand, be rec-
ognized with implied authority to adopt policy statements. I 
will examine this point in part 3 of this paper.
On the other hand, when no explicit statutory author-
ity is required, the guideline will be deemed valid as long 
as there is no obvious incompatibility between the guide-
line and the statute. One obvious incompatibility that has 
been sanctioned by courts is when a guideline prescribes a 
conduct to Board members, rather than providing guides to 
assist them in their exercise of a discretionary power. It is in 
this context that the doctrine of fettering of discretion was 
developed as a subclass of “abuse of discretionary powers” 
ground of review.
Th e fettering of discretion doctrine has been used primar-
ily to assess the validity of policy instruments such as guide-
lines.15 Judges examine whether Board members can exer-
cise their discretion in each matter coming before them. Th e 
exercise of discretion must not be “determined automatically 
or fettered by a rigid policy laid down in advance.”16
My main critique of this doctrine is that it is based on 
a false ontology about the nature of rules and guidelines. 
A very signifi cant number of legal rules do not directly af-
fect the rights and interests of individuals but confi ne and 
structure the powers granted to public authorities. In addi-
tion, many legal rules are not imperative (mandatory), but 
permissive and conditional (fl exible). Th is is especially true 
in the case of procedural rules because most of them have to 
provide space for the principles of natural justice to operate 
eff ectively. It is for this reason that the line between a pro-
cedural rule and a procedural guideline is too oft en blurred 
to support a convincing argument based on the fettering of 
discretion doctrine unless, of course, a Board makes the ob-
vious mistake of using imperative language in the text of the 
guideline, or any other markers,17 showing that the Board 
clearly intended to leave no measure of meaningful discre-
tion to be exercised by its decision makers. Presumably, the 
public administration now knows how to write its guidelines 
to meet the requirements of case law.
It is not at all clear that the fettering of discretion doc-
trine is helpful or adapted to especially examine the validity 
of procedural guidelines. Th e general question I am raising 
is whether an inquiry focusing on the mandatory character 
of a procedural guideline sheds light on an artifi cial problem, 
while obscuring real ones; problems that would be virtually 
impossible to bring to the surface because of the very frame-
work of analysis imposed by this doctrine. Th is issue is re-
lated to the second question asked by P. Carver in his paper: 
Are guidelines dealing with issues of hearing process more 
problematic than guidelines addressing substantive issues? 
His answer to this question is that it “seems less appropriate 
to issue a guideline going to procedure than to substantive 
considerations.” I disagree with this statement and I will de-
velop my arguments to support my position in part 3 of this 
paper. Finally, in relation to this issue, Carver notes that there 
is a “[ … ] discomfort with the combining in Th amotharem 
and Benitez of an analysis of ‘fettering discretion’ with that of 
‘procedural justice’” because these concepts do not cover the 
same territory.18 I agree with Carver and the next section is 
mainly dedicated to the kinds of legal discomforts that this 
ground of review raises, especially when applied to a proced-
ural guideline.
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As the case law evolves, however, there are some signs that 
the examination of the validity of a guideline, especially of a 
procedural guideline, is developing beyond a strict under-
standing of the fettering of discretion doctrine, to allow for a 
much deeper examination of the diversity in nature and pur-
poses of guidelines. Th is may in turn trigger the development 
of a more complete framework of analysis aimed at assessing 
the validity of policy instruments, focusing on the interpreta-
tion of the enabling statute as a whole in order to verify the 
compatibility of a guideline with the statute of which it pur-
ports to increase the eff ectiveness. From this perspective, I 
will examine in part 4 the compatibility of Guideline 7 with 
the IRPA.
2. Two Distinct Analytical Perspectives
In order to be successful in court in proving that a guideline 
is invalid, a party must demonstrate that it leaves no measure 
of meaningful discretion to be exercised by the public au-
thority; in other words, the guideline is binding on the deci-
sion makers. Th e validity of a guideline can be challenged on 
two grounds of review: the lack of jurisdiction of the Board 
to issue the guideline and the violation of the principles of 
natural justice. Arguments on each ground can be developed 
from two separate perspectives: instrumental and institu-
tional. Th ese perspectives are encapsulated in the three cri-
teria which were set by the Ainsley decision and applied by 
the judges of the Federal Court and the Federal Court of 
Appeal in Th amotharem and Benitez to analyze the validity 
of Guideline 7: (1) the language of the policy, including its 
application on a case-by-case basis; (2) the practical eff ect of 
failing to comply with the policy; and (3) the evidence with 
respect to the expectations of the Commission and staff  re-
garding the implementation of the policy instrument.19
First, a party may attempt to show that the language 
used in the guideline is mandatory and that, in practice, the 
guideline is applied by decision makers as if it were binding 
(criterion no. 1 of the Ainsley decision). I call this inquiry 
“instrumental” because it focuses on the guideline itself to 
determine if decision makers use this instrument not as a 
fl exible but as a mandatory normative tool. Second, a party 
may attempt to show that there are institutional pressures 
such that decision makers feel obliged to apply the guideline. 
Th e inquiry will focus on the eff ect of a decision maker fail-
ing to comply with the guideline as well as the expectations 
of the Chairperson of the tribunal regarding its implementa-
tion (criteria no. 2 and no. 3 of the Ainsley decision). I call 
this inquiry “institutional” because it does not focus on the 
guideline itself, but on decision makers and the environment 
in which they work.
I will fi rst review the Court’s analysis of criterion no. 1 
from the instrumental perspective. Second, I will examine 
the distinction between the application of criteria no. 2 and 
no. 3 when analyzed from the instrumental perspective and 
from the institutional perspective. I will argue that the in-
strumental perspective not only lacks relevancy to analyze 
a procedural guideline, but it also requires parties to gather 
evidence that is very diffi  cult to collect. With the institutional 
line of inquiry, the examination of the validity of a proced-
ural guideline is connected to the violation of the principles 
of natural justice. Th is analytical framework may prove to 
be more appropriate to assess the validity of guidelines de-
pending on the purpose of the very guideline under scru-
tiny.
2.1 Instrumental Perspective
As said earlier, the foundation of the instrumental perspec-
tive is based on the premise that there is an ontological dis-
tinction between a rule and a guideline. According to the 
Ainsley decision, a guideline will be found invalid if it crosses 
“the Rubicon between a non-mandatory guideline and a man-
datory pronouncement having the same eff ect as a statutory 
instrument.”20
Th is view is mainly encapsulated in the Ainsley analysis 
of the language and the application of a guideline (criter-
ion no. 1). On this issue, the analysis of the Federal Court 
in Th amotharem and Benitez turned around two arguments. 
First, the question was whether or not the use of the verbs 
in the passage “the standard practice will be for the RPO 
to begin and if no RPO is participating at the hearing, the 
Board member will begin” is an indication of the mandatory 
character of the Guideline 7. Th e second argument was built 
on paragraph 23 of the guideline, which allows for the Board 
member to vary the order of questioning. Th e question was 
whether the wording of paragraph 23 was suffi  ciently fl ex-
ible or whether the threshold was set too high. As written 
in Guideline 7, the order of questioning can be varied by 
a RPD member only in cases constituting exceptional cir-
cumstances, that is to say, only when claimants are severely 
disturbed or when a child is very young.21 Th e two justices 
of the Federal Court approached the problem from diff er-
ent angles. Blanchard J. focused his analysis on the language 
of the guideline, while Mosley J. examined the evidence re-
garding its application by RPD members.
In Th amotharem, Justice Blanchard expressed the opinion 
that “viewed in its entirety, the language of Guideline 7 leaves 
little doubt that the thrust of the guideline indicates to Board 
members a mandatory process rather than a recommended 
but optional process [ … ] is imperative.”22 In Benitez, Justice 
Mosley examined the evidence presented by the Board show-
ing that RPD members have exercised their discretion to vary 
the order of questioning. Some forty decisions and excerpts 
of transcripts from hearings before various RPD members 
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were fi led as new evidence in the Court’s record. Th is evi-
dence satisfi ed Justice Mosley that RPD members can choose 
to disregard the standard practice when they deemed it ne-
cessary.23
Justice Evans disagreed with both judges as to the manner 
in which the problem should be analyzed. He disagreed with 
Justice Mosley insofar as he was of the view that there should 
not be much if any signifi cance attached to the diff erences 
in the records.24 From Justice Evans’s perspective, a judge 
should pay more attention to the language of a guideline than 
to the evidence regarding its application, because it “is in-
herently diffi  cult to predict how decision makers will apply a 
guideline, especially in an agency, like the Board, with a large 
membership sitting in panels.”25 I agree with Justice Evans’s 
opinion. From the perspective of the individual attempting 
to show the invalidity of a guideline, bringing clear evidence 
that the guideline is routinely applied as if it were mandatory 
is a highly diffi  cult task. Many obstacles prevent outsiders 
from assembling this type of evidence.26
With respect to the language used in the text of a guide-
line, Justice Evans disagreed partly with the analysis of Justice 
Blanchard in Th amotharem. Even if both shared the view 
that Guideline 7 was imposing more than a “recommended 
but optional process,”, Justice Evans stated that it was per-
fectly valid for a Board to establish how discretion would 
“normally” [Evans J. emphasis] be exercised as long as a “de-
cision-maker may deviate from normal practice in the light 
of particular facts.”27 Here, Justice Evans indicated clearly 
that, unless there is explicit language showing the mandatory 
character of a guideline, all other signs indicating normative 
constraints on the exercise of Board members’ discretion will 
be deemed valid.28
In this sense, Justice Evans recognized the existence of a 
continuum in (or a degree of) normativity: “legal rules and 
discretion do not inhabit diff erent universes, but are arrayed 
along a continuum.”29 Th is view is in not only in accord with 
the diversity of legal norms found in statutes and regula-
tions in contemporary public law, but also with the Board’s 
usage of guidelines. Th e IRB is a very good example to show 
the case at point. When one looks at the policy instruments 
issued by the IRB, it becomes clear that, as a matter of fact, 
the IRB conceptualizes the mandatory character of its policy 
instruments in terms of degrees:
Th ere is no doubt that, save for the “persuasive decisions,” 
all the policy instruments of the IRB are not optional for the 
Board members. Th ey are meant to regulate their conduct 
during proceedings, either in a substantive or in a proced-
ural manner, and in a more or less constraining fashion de-
pending on how quickly the problem perceived by the IRB 
should be solved. Indeed, the Chairperson’s instructions are 
clearly imperative.
Th is diversity of policy instruments issued by the IRB is 
an eloquent testimony to the complexity of contemporary 
legal systems: they are not composed solely of formal sources 
of norms that we recognized as “law,” but also of informal 
(explicit and implicit) norms.30 It is suggested that it is from 
this perspective that courts have (or should have) recognized 
that boards are permitted to issue a broad range of guidelines 
without needing an explicit grant of statutory power. Indeed, 
policy instruments may oft en be the only viable solution to 
solve daily problems that boards encounter in their daily 
functioning.
With respect to the specifi c problem of the mandatory 
character of a procedural guideline, the following question 
will provide the basis for the analysis: is it accurate that all 
procedural guidelines can never be mandatory? In my view, 
some procedural guidelines can be. Th e obvious example is 
that, when Parliament grants a power to a public authority 
to issue mandatory procedural guidelines, they will be valid 
and can “no more be characterized as an unlawful fetter on 
members’ exercise of discretion.”31 In the case of Guideline 7, 
it is clear as Justice Evans pointed out in Th amotharem that 
Parliament has not authorized the IRB to issue mandatory 
guidelines. Section 159(1)(h) entitles the Chairperson to 
issue guidelines to assist members in the conduct of their 
duties and not to prescribe to them how to conduct their dut-
ies. However, in my opinion, s. 159(1)(h) of the IRPA does 
not preclude the possibility of issuing mandatory procedural 
guidelines. Two situations come to mind.
First, when a tribunal codifi es well-established common 
law principles of natural justice, the guideline can take a man-
datory form (for example, when case law would clearly state 
that claimants of a given category have a right to counsel). 
In this specifi c case, the guideline would simply codify posi-
tive law. Second, it can also be suggested that absent case law, 
it would be perfectly legal for a tribunal to issue guidelines 
which would confer greater or clearer procedural protection 
to claimants (and therefore prefer to resort to a statement of 
policy applicable across the board, than to the case-by-case 
incremental technique to implement changes).32 Beside these 
two scenarios, guidelines must be draft ed to ensure that the 
principles of procedural justice will operate eff ectively in the 
legal system in which they are applied.
One fi nal issue is related to the proper fi eld of jurisdic-
tion between rule-making authority and policy-making 
authority. Th is question was discussed by Justice Evans in 
Th amotharem because in addition to the policy-making 
power conferred on the IRB by s. 159(1)(h) of the IRPA, s. 
161(1)(a) of the Act also grants to the Board the power to 
make rules of practice and procedure. Th e questions asked 
were: Is there an exclusive domain for rules? If yes, what type 
of norms is comprised in it? If this fi eld does not encom-
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pass all the rules, do rule-making and policy-making powers 
overlap, and if yes, to what extent? Justice Evans expressed 
the general view that guidelines and rules do not have the 
same legal eff ects, while recognizing that the two can over-
lap.33 As Justice Evans observed, the diff erences in the legal 
characteristics of statutory rules of procedure and Guideline 
7 should not be overstated.34
In order to bring some precision to Justice Evans’s view, 
it is interesting to look closely at the RPD rules of practice 
and procedure. Refugee Protection Division Rules can be div-
ided into two categories, each comprised of roughly 50 per 
cent of all rules: those addressed directly to claimants and 
those addressed directly to RPD members35 Of the 50 per 
cent of rules speaking directly to refugee claimants and the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration around 40 per cent 
of them do so in mandatory language (“must”). Since these 
rules impose practice and procedure duties on the parties, 
the Division had no choice but to proceed through a legisla-
tive instrument. Th is is one specifi c fi eld reserved to legisla-
tion (primary and subordinate). Indeed, legal norms aff ect-
ing rights and obligations of individuals must be stated in 
statutes or regulations.
Th e other 50 per cent of rules speak to RPD members (or 
RPO). Only around 10 per cent of rules are mandatory for 
Members and RPOs (“must”). However, for the vast majority 
of these rules, they codify common law principles (notice to 
appear, notice of decision, notice prior to the use of special-
ized knowledge) protective of claimants’ rights and interests. 
As for the remaining 40 per cent of rules, they either give 
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Figure 1. IRB Guidelines/Mandatory Index
Note: Th is fi gure was made by the author from the description of each policy instrument provided by the IRB on its website, <http://
www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/policy/rules/index_e.htm>. Here is a summary: Persuasive decisions: Unlike Jurisprudential Guides, 
decision makers are not required to explain their decision to not apply a persuasive decision in appropriate circumstances. Th eir applica-
tion is voluntary. Policies are fl exible instruments, and the degree to which they are mandatory varies with the content of the policy. Th ey 
oft en contain elements which are mandatory, but may also provide general guidance or defi ne areas in which the exercise of discretion is 
required; Policy notes are memoranda which serve as an informal way of providing policy guidance. Jurisprudential guides: Th e applica-
tion of a Jurisprudential Guide is not mandatory. However, decision makers are expected to apply Jurisprudential Guides in cases with 
similar facts or provide reasoned justifi cations for not doing so. Chairperson’s guidelines: While they are not mandatory, decision makers 
are expected to apply them or provide a reasoned justifi cation for not doing so. Chairperson’s Instructions provide formal direction that 
obliges specifi c IRB personnel to take or to avoid specifi c actions.
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cretion to exercise to determine procedural issues. As said 
earlier, policy instruments can also be used to achieve these 
two same results. As a consequence, one must conclude that, 
as far as norms speaking directly to the RPD are concerned, 
there is no striking diff erence between procedural rules and 
procedural guidelines. Th is entire fi eld can overlap. However, 
if a guideline confl icts with a rule, the latter will prevail.36
When examining the validity of a procedural guideline, 
the question related to their mandatory character does not 
appear to be as signifi cant as in the case of substantive guide-
lines. On this point, it is interesting to note that Justice Evans 
did not seem to attach so much importance to this factor 
in Th amotharem when he analyzed the question whether 
Guideline 7 was a fetter on RPD members’ discretion. As 
he wrote: a policy instrument “must not be so coercive as to 
raise a reasonable apprehension that members’ ability to de-
cide cases free from improper constraints has been under-
mined.”37 Th e words used by Justice Evans are important be-
cause, as far as procedural policy instruments are concerned, 
it is possible to impose a fairly high level of constraints on 
decision makers when the problem to be solved warrants 
it. Indeed, his analysis of the constraints imposed on RPD 
members is revealing in this respect. As long as they serve 
the “legitimate interest” of the IRB, he does not fi nd them 
“at all sinister,”38 notably given the fact the IRB is the “largest 
administrative agency in Canada” where hearings are con-
ducted “mostly by single members.”39
In sum, the inquiry into the mandatory character of a 
guideline might be suffi  cient in some cases, for example, 
when a policy instrument speaks directly to persons and af-
fects their rights and interests. On this point, it is import-
ant to note that Justice Evans cautioned judges on the use 
of the Ainsley criteria to examine all types of guidelines, for 
the policy statement that was considered in that case aff ected 
directly the rights and interests of businesses and thus more 
clearly bore the mark of a “rule.”40
However, when a policy speaks directly to public author-
ities (such as Guideline 7, which is directed at the practice of 
RPD members by laying down the standard conduct that is 
expected from RPD members), this inquiry into the manda-
tory character of a policy instrument is bound to have less 
impact in contemporary administrative law. Indeed, from 
Maple Lodge and Th amotharem, we know that a guideline 
can have a normative eff ect (that is to say that it can regulate 
the conduct of public authorities) and that having a norma-
tive eff ect does not automatically mean that the guideline 
is mandatory and, therefore, invalid. In fact, it can be con-
cluded from these judgments that the fettering of discretion 
doctrine can be clearly and easily applied to the seldom truly 
mandatory substantive guidelines. All other cases involving 
other normative guidelines would require clear evidence that 
the guideline fetters the discretion of decision makers. As 
said earlier, bringing such evidence to a court is a very dif-
fi cult and complex task for a party contesting the validity of a 
guideline, if not impossible in the case of the IRB.
Th e instrumental perspective off ers a superfi cial under-
standing of guidelines. It aims at targeting the most off ensive 
guidelines (and especially those directly aff ecting the rights 
and interests of the persons). It does not allow for a deeper 
analysis of the eff ect of the guideline on the legislative design 
and on the role of the various actors into the legal system 
in which a guideline operates. Presumably for this reason, 
Justice Evans quickly moved away from a strict instrumental 
perspective to adopt an institutional perspective to examine 
the validity of Guideline 7.
2.2 Institutional Perspective
From an institutional perspective, guidelines are examined 
with the view to understand their role both in the operation-
al environment of a board and more precisely in the legal 
environment set by statute to protect the independence of 
decision makers. In the context of an administrative tribu-
nal, the institutional perspective recognizes that there can 
be internal tensions between the objectives of the institution 
per se (personifi ed by the chairperson) and those of tribu-
nal members. Criteria no. 2 and no. 3 of the Ainsley deci-
sion (the eff ects of failing to comply with the guideline for a 
board member and the expectations of a board with respect 
to the implementation of a guideline) aim at encapsulating 
this inner tension within a board. However, the development 
of the institutional perspective did not start in Ainsley, but in 
Consolidated-Bathurst of the Supreme Court.41
Although Ainsley was decided in 1994, Justice Doherty 
made no reference to Consolidated-Bathurst in her judgment. 
Th ere are at least two reasons for which these two decisions 
remained disconnected. First, Ainsley concerned substantive 
guidelines while Consolidated-Bathurst concerned proced-
ural guidelines (to be more accurate, a procedural practice). 
Second, the ground of review to contest the procedure of 
full board meetings in Consolidated-Bathurst was a breach 
of the rules of natural justice. Th e appellant’s main argument 
against the practice of holding full board meetings was that 
these meetings can be used to fetter the independence of the 
panel members. For obvious reasons, this ground of review 
could not have been argued in Ainsley for it concerned sub-
stantive guidelines.
Nevertheless, judges used criteria no. 2 and no. 3 in 
Th amotharem and Benitez, and referred to Ainsley and 
Consolidated-Bathurst, either to determine if a public author-
ity has jurisdiction to issue the impugned guideline (Ainsley) 
or to determine if the procedure violates the principles of nat-
ural justice (Consolidated-Bathurst). My claim is that applying 
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the Ainsley criteria no. 2 and no. 3 to a procedural guideline, 
such as Guideline 7, to determine if a board has jurisdiction 
to issue that guideline raises questions as to the usefulness of 
such an inquiry. Indeed, a party contesting a procedural guide-
line, such as Guideline 7, must bring clear evidence based on 
criteria no. 2 and no. 3 to show that it fetters RPD members’ 
discretion, meaning here that it prevents the principles of nat-
ural justice to operate eff ectively in the decision-making pro-
cess of this Board. As the analyses of Justices Blanchard and 
Mosley showed in Th amotharem and Benitez, this inquiry did 
not lead to very conclusive results.
In Th amotharem, Justice Blanchard fi rst stated that he 
was not convinced that the monitoring exercise conducted 
by the IRB could be said “to be inappropriate or, on its own, 
constitute a clear indicator of fettering of a Board member’s 
discretion,”42 but then he moved on and wrote that he was 
“satisfi ed that there [was] signifi cant evidence that the IRB 
made known to its members that they are expected to com-
ply with the guideline save in exceptional cases.”43 In Benitez, 
Justice Mosley reached a completely diff erent conclusion on 
this point. He found that there was no evidence on the record 
to suggest that the Chairperson “has threatened to, or has in 
fact, sanctioned any Board member for non-compliance with 
Guideline 7.”44 Th ereaft er, Justice Mosley found that there 
was evidence that monitoring procedures were voluntary 
and that “even if RPD members were asked to explain why 
they did not follow the guideline,” there was “no evidence 
of any consequences fl owing to those who chose to ignore 
or to not strictly apply them.”45 Th is line of inquiry does not 
lead to a relevant answer to the question as to whether the 
principles of natural justice can still operate eff ectively in the 
refugee determination process.46
Presumably, Justice Evans saw the problem and, for this 
reason, he decided to focus his analysis on the question as to 
whether Guideline 7 fettered RPD members’ independence 
and impartiality. By this, he clearly shift ed the analysis to the 
terrain of the violation of the principles of natural justice, fol-
lowing the path traced by the Supreme Court in Consolidated-
Bathurst. Th is was an interesting move because it expands the 
application of Consolidated-Bathurst (Tremblay and Ellis Don) 
to all types of procedural policy instruments, rather than 
keeping it to the confi nes of full board meetings. Moreover, 
and more specifi cally in the context of the evolution of the 
case law pertaining to independence of administrative tribu-
nal, Justice Evans also invites judges to show greater aware-
ness in the protection of tribunals’ sphere of adjudication. 
However, and as Evans J. rightly pointed out, adjudicative in-
dependence “is not an all or nothing thing, but it is a question 
of degree.”47 On this point, Justice Evans found that Guideline 
7 does not create the kind of coercive environment which un-
duly constrains Board members’ independence.48
Next, I will explore Justice Evans’s reasons on this argu-
ment in more detail. For the moment, suffi  ce it to say that I 
believe his view about the degree of infl uence that a guide-
line may exert on a board member to decide according to 
their own conscience and opinion is relevant depending 
on the nature and purpose of the guideline under review. 
On this point, it is not all that clear that this line of inquiry 
was relevant in the case of a procedural guideline, such as 
Guideline 7.
3. Nature and Purpose of a Guideline
In starting the discussion on the eff ect of Guideline 7 on the 
independence and impartiality of RPD members, Justice 
Evans recalled the basic principle that decision makers “must 
perform their adjudicative functions without improper in-
fl uence from others, including the Chairperson and other 
members of the Board.”49 Th us, the discussion is framed in a 
specifi c context, that of a decentralized agency conferred with 
adjudicative powers. Th e degree of independence conferred 
on administrative tribunals in general varies depending on 
several factors.50 I will not review the factors here. Suffi  ce it 
to say that case law recognizes that a purely adjudicative tri-
bunal such as the RPD, the decisions of which aff ect funda-
mental rights, is entitled to a high degree of independence.51 
Th e consequence fl owing from this fi nding is two-fold.
First, it is not a given that such tribunals should be rec-
ognized with implicit powers to issue substantive as well as 
procedural guidelines. My claim is that both types of guide-
lines raise completely diff erent legal problems with respect 
to independence of Board members. Substantive guidelines 
cannot be issued by purely administrative tribunals, for they 
raise a constitutional law problem.52 Procedural guidelines 
can be based on implicit powers and their validity raises an 
administrative law problem. However, this question was not 
at issue in Th amotharem insofar as Guideline 7 is a proced-
ural guideline and also because Justice Evans stated that sec-
tion 159(1)(h) of the IRPA entitles the Chairperson to issue 
substantive as well as procedural guidelines.53
Nevertheless, the question that s. 159(1)(h) raises is wheth-
er it matters to distinguish between substance and procedure 
to determine if a guideline fetters the independence and im-
partiality of purely adjudicative tribunals, such as the RPD. 
My answer to this question is that it does. My claim is that the 
analysis of the mandatory character of a substantive guide-
line can be fairly straightforward. If a judge fi nds that such a 
guideline is mandatory in the sense that it leaves no measure 
of meaningful discretion to be exercised by decision maker, it 
could be found invalid on the fettering of discretion doctrine. 
However, in the case of a procedural guideline, the analysis of 
the mandatory character is more complex and answers should 
be more nuanced. Th is question will be examined fi rst.
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Second, Justice Evans also added that the principle of in-
dependence can be tempered insofar as the jurisprudence 
recognized that “administrative agencies must be free to de-
vise processes for ensuring an acceptable level of consistency 
and quality in their decisions.”54 Th is sentence encapsulates 
another important question for the examination of the valid-
ity of a policy instrument: the purpose of the tool. Justice 
Evans speaks of procedural tools aiming at fostering con-
sistency. I agree with Justice Evans that when policy instru-
ments aim at fostering consistency, it is very relevant to con-
duct an analysis within the framework of independence and 
impartiality. However, I disagree with Justice Evans when he 
writes that Guideline 7 is a tool that was created by the IRB 
to enhance consistency. Th e primary purpose of Guideline 7 
is to foster expediency of decision making by RPD members. 
In my view, when such a purpose is assigned to a procedural 
guideline, it is questionable whether the independence and 
impartiality framework of analysis is helpful to reach conclu-
sive fi ndings with respect to the validity of such a guideline.
3.1 Substance and Procedure
Substantive and procedural policy instruments may exert 
diff erent degrees of infl uence on decision makers. Th e basic 
legal framework created for purely adjudicative tribunals by 
Parliament confers a diff erent degree of autonomy on these 
tribunals to determine issues of substance and of procedure. 
Th us, the analysis of the validity of substantive and proced-
ural guidelines cannot be conducted within the same legal 
parameters, even if, in both cases, these policy instruments 
are issued to exercise some normative constraints on deci-
sion makers. However, the constraints should be proportion-
ate to a meaningful preservation of the integrity of the pow-
ers granted to decision makers by the statutory framework.
It is not at all clear that a purely adjudicative tribunal is 
entitled to issue substantive guidelines, unless it is explicitly 
authorized by statute. One important reason militates in fa-
vour of this view: substantive guidelines are not compatible 
with the statutory mandate conferred by Parliament on this 
type of tribunal. Indeed, purely adjudicative tribunals do 
not have powers to make substantive regulations conferred 
on them, unlike regulatory agencies, the role of which is to 
regulate specifi c economic activities. Purely adjudicative tri-
bunals are not entitled to change, modify, or adjust the ap-
plication of statutory provisions through norms of general 
application of their own making. Th e only tool available to 
them is interpretation, insofar as one accepts the view that 
interpretation does have, through the passage of time, the ef-
fect of modifying the statute.
Decision makers’ role in a purely adjudicative tribunal is 
to adhere to the views of Parliament as expressed in their 
governing statute, and not to the views of the government of 
the day nor to those of the Chairperson (contrary to regula-
tory agencies where both public authorities can exercise far 
more leadership through either guidelines, orders, or regu-
lations). Th erefore, purely adjudicative tribunals have little 
substantive autonomy when compared to other decentral-
ized agencies. In this context, the examination of the manda-
tory character of a guideline should be strictly conducted be-
cause the distinction between “mandatory” and “permissive” 
guidelines matters a great deal. Mandatory guidelines would 
clearly constitute an excess of jurisdiction when issued by 
purely adjudicative tribunals, unless Parliament has expressly 
authorized a particular tribunal to resort to such mandatory 
policy instruments.
Moreover, the Chairperson of a purely adjudicative tribu-
nal should be very careful in draft ing substantive guidelines 
to ensure that he or she leaves suffi  cient room to decision 
makers to interpret the statute as they see fi t given the facts 
of a case. Substantive guidelines must preserve the integrity 
of the substantive adjudicative power conferred upon them 
by Parliament and the normative constraints they impose 
on decision makers should be kept to a minimum. Judges 
should not hesitate to interfere when the content of a sub-
stantive guideline is not compatible with these parameters. 
An example of a good practice in this regard is the IRB. Th e 
Chairperson of the IRB was successful in devising substan-
tive guidelines respectful of the independence of its mem-
bers and to preserve their interpretative sphere of autonomy 
conferred by the IRPA. For example, Guidelines 4 provide a 
framework of analysis to guide members when they deter-
mine specifi c substantive issues.55
When examining the validity of procedural guidelines, 
two general questions should be discussed separately: fi rst, 
the degree of autonomy of purely adjudicative tribunals with 
respect to procedural questions; second, the appropriate and 
valid degree of mandatory character of guidelines.
With respect to the degree of autonomy, it has long been a 
principle of administrative law that administrative tribunals 
are masters of their own procedure. Decision makers do not 
need explicit statutory powers to determine how cases will 
proceed in front of them. Th erefore, the problem of formal 
legality (in the sense that a specifi c grant of power must be 
given in a statute) is irrelevant insofar as the procedure is 
compatible with the process established by Parliament. As 
a consequence, whether decision makers make procedural 
choices incrementally or through procedural guidelines (or 
through rules when the statute authorizes the use of this in-
strument) does not matter as long as their procedural deci-
sions do not violate the principles of natural justice.
Whatever the procedural tool used by a tribunal, the prin-
ciples of natural justice must be able to operate to ensure 
meaningful protection to parties of their right to be heard 
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by an impartial tribunal, or, at the very least, have a neutral 
eff ect on these protections (assuming that such as neutral ef-
fect is indeed possible). Th erefore, the question of the valid-
ity of a guideline must be looked at from a concrete perspec-
tive (What is the eff ect of Guideline 7 on the right to be heard 
by an impartial tribunal of refugee claimants?), rather than 
an abstract perspective (Does the guideline leave a meaning-
ful measure of discretion to be exercised?). With respect to 
Guideline 7, that is to say, to a procedural guideline aiming 
at fostering expediency, this concrete perspective is encapsu-
lated in section 162(2) of the IRPA: “Each Division shall deal 
with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the 
circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural 
justice permit.”
With respect to the appropriate and valid degree of man-
datory character of procedural guidelines, it is important to 
recall that its function in the decision making process of a 
board is of primary importance. As pointed out earlier, a 
guideline can take a mandatory form when its function is 
simply to codify positive law, or to confer greater or clearer 
procedural protection to claimants. Outside these two scen-
arios, the inquiry should focus on the question as to whether 
a procedural guideline leaves suffi  cient discretion to Board 
members to ensure that the principles of natural justice can 
operate eff ectively in the legal system in which it is applied. 
In other words, a board member must be able to determine 
what participatory rights to the procedure would be fair to 
grant to a claimant, given her requests for procedural pro-
tection in a given situation, and to decide in an impartial 
manner. However, not all procedural guidelines necessarily 
violate both principles of natural justice in and of themselves. 
In order to make a choice as to which principle may be vio-
lated, it is crucial to examine the purpose of the guideline. 
In relation to Guideline 7, I will analyze next two purposes: 
procedural consistency and procedural expediency.
3.2 Consistency and Expediency
At fi rst glance, procedural guidelines potentially impact to a 
lesser extent on the independence and impartiality of decision 
makers than substantive guidelines do. Admittedly, among all 
types of guidelines, substantive guidelines exert the greatest 
infl uence on the ability of a decision maker to decide accord-
ing to their own conscience and opinion, because they are 
issued for the main purpose of fostering consistency of public 
authorities’ decisions. However, we know since Consolidated-
Bathurst and Tremblay that the purpose of procedural guide-
lines can also be to foster consistency and, therefore, can also 
illegally impinge on members’ independence.
In Th amotharem, Justice Evans analyzed the valid-
ity of Guideline 7 through the lenses of independence of 
board members. He based his analysis on the teaching of 
Consolidated-Bathurst and Tremblay because he saw some 
similarities of purposes of Guideline 7 and the full board 
meeting procedure. He viewed them both as policy instru-
ments aiming at fostering consistency. If the purpose of 
Guideline 7 were truly to foster consistency, I would have 
agreed with Justice Evans’s analysis, but my view is that such 
is not the case. Th e primary goal of Guideline 7 is to foster 
expediency of the RPD decision-making process.
Before going further into these explanations, a few words 
are necessary on the meanings of the concept of consistency. 
Th ere are at least two meanings to the concept. Th e fi rst 
meaning relates to a “thick” version of the concept; the 
second meaning, to a “thin” version. In its thick version, con-
sistency refers to the principle “treat like cases alike.”56 It is 
about logical coherence of substantive reasons bringing a de-
cision maker to decide one way or another. Th e thick version 
is about the “what” and requires a decision maker to not be 
aff ected by his personal biases and preferences. In this thick 
sense “consistency” is considered to be an aspect of the rule 
of law.57
In its thin version, consistency refers to the manner in 
which a case is decided: the procedure. Procedural con-
sistency is about the “how” and is linked to fairness. Th e 
demand for fairness arises when there is a diff erence in the 
procedural treatment between cases. Th e demand is satis-
fi ed when the reasons that “justify a process that might end 
up treating cases diff erently even though their character-
istic are the same.”58 It is precisely to meet the demand for 
fairness that Guideline 7 includes paragraph 23. Recall that 
paragraph 23 allows a member to vary the order of question-
ing by permitting the claimant to present his case fi rst if the 
claimant shows that his circumstances are exceptional. Save 
for exceptional circumstances, all cases are treated through 
the reverse order questioning procedure.
In this sense, Guideline 7 fosters consistency, but only the 
thin version of consistency. Indeed, before the Chairperson 
issued Guideline 7, the order of questioning was within the 
discretion of each RPD board member. As a result the order 
of questioning was not uniform among regions in Canada 
or among members within a region. Th erefore, Guideline 7 
aims at fostering consistency of the procedure followed by 
RPD members across Canada. Unlike the full board meeting 
procedure examined in the Supreme Court trilogy, Guideline 
7 has no impact (or negligible impact) on fostering substan-
tive consistency. Th erefore, the issue as to whether Guideline 
7 creates a reasonable apprehension of bias does not appear 
to be particularly relevant to resolve the issue as to its valid-
ity. Resorting to the reverse order of questioning does not 
clearly impede the ability of RPD members to decide accord-
ing to their own conscience and opinion. It may have an im-
pact on the quality of the decisions, but not because they are 
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inconsistent (thick version), but because they were unfairly 
decided. On this point, all judges agreed that Guideline 7 was 
procedurally fair, but they also all agreed that violation of the 
principle of procedural fairness will be dealt with on a case-
by-case basis.
However, this fi nding does not close the inquiry. Indeed, 
even if a procedural guideline does not violate the principles 
of natural justice or procedural fairness as found in case law, 
it can nonetheless be found invalid for incompatibility with 
the process established by the statute. A party contesting a 
guideline should demonstrate through legal interpretation 
that a guideline is not compatible with the statutory powers 
conferred to a board.
4. Compatibility of Guideline 7 with the IRPA
Th e Canadian Council for Refugees, intervening in 
Th amotharem and Benitez, raised the question as to whether 
Guideline 7 transformed the refugee determination process 
to such a point as to render it incompatible with the IRPA. 
None of the judges of the Federal Court of Appeal thought 
that Guideline 7 was incompatible with the IRPA, but no 
clear justifi cations were provided to support this statement. 
In this section, I will look at the compatibility of Guideline 7 
with two provisions of the IRPA.
Th e fi rst provision is s. 162(2).59 It confers a duty on each 
division of the IRB to “deal with all proceedings before it as 
informally and quickly as the circumstances and the con-
siderations of fairness and natural justice permit.” Th us, the 
question I will examine fi rst is whether Guideline 7 main-
tains a balance between expediency and fairness. Th e second 
provision is s. 170 a).60 With it, the RPD had conferred upon 
it an explicit power to inquire with the promulgation of the 
IRPA.61 Th is grant of explicit power appears to be an un-
known legal phenomenon in the realm of purely adjudicative 
tribunals. Th is engenders an interpretative problem since 
case law does not provide meaningful parameters to guide 
the interpretation of the scope of the power to inquire when 
used by this type of decentralized public authority. Th erefore, 
the interpreter has to start anew. Th is is the task to which I 
will turn in section 4.2 of this paper.
In the following section, however, I will fi rst present 
some of the arguments which could be made in support of 
the view that Guideline 7 raises concerns with respect to 
its compatibility with the IRPA. My goal is to show that a 
more detailed analysis of the compatibility of Guideline 7 
with the IRPA would have been gained in being conducted 
in Th amotharem.
4.1 Maintaining a Balance between Expediency and 
Fairness
To answer the question as to whether Guideline 7 maintains 
a balance between expediency and fairness, a return to para-
graph 23 of Guideline 7 is essential. Th is paragraph entitles a 
RPD member to vary the order of questioning when she is of 
the opinion that exceptional circumstances exist. To exem-
plify what the Chairperson means by exceptional circum-
stances, paragraph 23 speaks of cases involving a “severely 
disturbed claimant” or a “very young child.” However, it is 
not at all clear that these “examples” are merely “examples.” 
Th ey can be construed as constituting strict categories of 
situations for which a member will agree to vary the order 
of questioning, to the exclusion of other types of situations. 
In order to make this point, one has to examine the interplay 
between two IRB guidelines: Guideline 7 and Guideline 8 - 
Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons 
Appearing Before the Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada,62 which became eff ective in December 2006. Th e ef-
fect of Guideline 8 is to limit the scope of the application of 
Guideline 7 in two ways: (1) to obtain an order varying the 
order of questioning; (2) to confi ne its application to the two 
“examples” provided in paragraph 23.
With respect to the fi rst point, Guideline 8 specifi es to 
Board members that they can resort to a whole range of 
procedures, such as varying the order of questioning, to ac-
commodate the specifi c vulnerability of a claimant. Varying 
the order of questioning is only one means among eight pro-
posed to Board members in Guideline 8.63 Th erefore, the 
application of paragraph 23 of Guideline 7 is only one pos-
sibility. And since paragraph 23 applies only to exceptional 
circumstances, it is reasonable to argue that Board members 
are implicitly required to grant an application to vary the or-
der of questioning only aft er they examined other procedural 
accommodations laid down in Guideline 8.
With respect to the second point, Guideline 8 plays a sig-
nifi cant role in the classifi cation of refugee claims in terms 
of the degree of vulnerability of claimants. According to 
Guideline 8, there appear to be two levels of vulnerability: 
common and severe.
For the purposes of this Guideline, vulnerable persons 
are individuals whose ability to present their cases before 
the IRB is severely impaired. Such persons may include, but 
would not be limited to, the mentally ill, minors, the elderly, 
victims of torture, survivors of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, and women who have suff ered gender-related per-
secution.64
Th is Guideline addresses diffi  culties which go beyond those 
that are common to most persons appearing before the IRB. It 
is intended to apply to individuals who face particular diffi  -
culty and who require special consideration in the procedural 
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handling of their cases. It applies to the more severe cases of 
vulnerability. [Emphasis added]65
Given that Guideline 8 clearly applies only to “the more 
severe cases of vulnerability” (referring in this to the language 
used by paragraph 23 of Guideline 7) and that it is only in 
these cases that the possibility of varying the order of ques-
tioning is open to accommodate claimants, it becomes rather 
clear that paragraph 23 of Guideline 7 has no life in and of 
itself: its scope is meant to be construed in light of Guideline 
8. Th erefore, it is reasonable to argue that when Guideline 7 
speaks of “severely disturbed claimant” as being merely an 
example of situation for which the order of questioning can 
by varied, it is inaccurate. It is a strict and exclusive category 
of cases (together with “the very young child” category) for 
which paragraph 23 can come into play. As a consequence, it 
is unlikely that RPD members retain any measure of mean-
ingful discretion to determine if they will grant an order to 
vary the order of questioning in the case of a claimant not 
falling into either one of the two categories set by paragraph 
23. From this interpretation, it appears that the only discre-
tion they have left  is to determine whether varying the order 
of questioning is the appropriate procedure to accommodate 
the specifi c vulnerability of a claimant.
On a fi nal note, it is important to say that, for the mo-
ment, it is not possible to check the validity of this inter-
pretation. Even if the IRB produced some forty decisions in 
Th amotharem to show how paragraph 23 is applied by RPD 
members, the decision of the Court does not provide specifi c 
information on these cases to enable scholars to conduct 
proper research. In addition, the IRB appears to be very re-
luctant to publish these decisions in the Quicklaw (QL) data-
bank. Indeed, we found only a couple of RPD decisions in 
which the member agreed to vary the order of questioning.66 
Although the panels agreed with the objection, their reasons 
were supposed to be found in an appendix to the decision, 
but were not made available through QL. As a result, there 
is no signifi cant public information readily available on the 
parameters of the application of paragraph 23.
In sum, the interplay of Guidelines 7 and 8 raises the issue 
as to whether the creation of categories of claimants entitled 
to the procedural accommodation set out in paragraph 23 
has the eff ect of favouring expeditiousness at the expense of 
fairness in determining claims for refugee status.
4.2 Th e Scope of the Statutory Power to Inquire
When a guideline is related to a specifi c statutory power, it is 
useful to fi rst inquire as to the function of this guideline in 
relation to that power. Since I already developed this ques-
tion in other papers, I will simply recall that a guideline can 
aff ect a legal system in diff erent ways, such as delimiting its 
parameters by confi ning and structuring discretion, or by 
developing or by transforming it (at which point of course 
the legality of the guideline is clearly disputable).67 With re-
spect to Guideline 7, the IRB claims that its function is to 
delimit the scope of the power to inquire. More specifi c-
ally, the Board is of the opinion that the power to inquire 
means that RPD members can “defi ne what issues must be 
resolved in order for them to render a decision.”68 Th e IRB 
feels confi dent that Guideline 7 is compatible with the IRPA. 
Justice Evans agreed with this view, but for another reason. 
His argument is that Guideline 7 is compatible with the IRPA 
procedural model created for the RPD, which he qualifi ed as 
inquisitorial. In this section, I will bring counter argument to 
dispute both points of view. I will start with an examination 
of the qualifi cation that the refugee determination process is 
“inquisitorial,” and will move thereaft er to an examination of 
the IRB interpretation of the scope of the power to inquire.
Th e nature of the refugee determination process intrigues 
many researchers and scholars (including those among the 
IRB itself) since, in its offi  cial documents, the Board some-
times refers to a “non-adversarial process”69 and at other 
times to an “inquisitorial process”70 to qualify the decision 
making procedure of the RPD. Th e point is that there ap-
pears to be a diffi  culty in identifying the precise nature of the 
refugee determination process. It is clear that the claimant 
must discharge her burden of proof that she is a refugee or 
a person in need of protection. However, there is usually no 
opposite party to contest her claim or to check the truthful-
ness of her story. If the RPD member is of the opinion that 
the claim is not well-founded, he has to be somewhat en-
titled to challenge the claimant by inquiring into the claim, 
in order to ultimately make a determination according to his 
conscience and opinion. However, being able to inquire into 
a claim does not mean that the process is inquisitorial.
In common law (and civil law) an inquisitorial system is 
distinguished from an adversarial system. In an inquisitorial 
system, the judge has a prosecuting role. Th is procedure is 
characterized by the fact that all initiatives, from the fi rst to 
the last day of the trial, are taken by the judge: the introduc-
tion of the instance, the direction of the trial, the gatherings 
of facts, and the assembling of the evidence.71 An adversarial 
process is characterized by a procedure in which the parties 
take, exclusively or principally, the initiatives of introducing 
the instance, its direction, and its instruction.72 Decision 
makers play no prosecutorial role: the function of judging 
and prosecuting are partitioned.
It is a given that the refugee determination process is not 
adversarial, but it is also legally inaccurate to speak of it as 
being inquisitorial. Board members do not prosecute refu-
gee claimants: their role is not to fi nd suffi  cient evidence to 
“make the Board’s case” against a claimant. Beside its legal in-
accuracy, the insistence on avoiding the word “inquisitorial” 
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to qualify the RPD process is important for two additional 
reasons. First, it sends confusing signals to Board members, 
especially those without legal training. Second, and most 
importantly, an insistence on the inquisitorial nature of the 
IRB process may trigger questions as to its constitutional 
validity. Recall that the Supreme Court decided in Régie des 
permis d’alcool that impartiality requires separation of func-
tions between that of a “prosecutor” and that of an “adjudi-
cator” within a board. Although this decision was based on 
the Quebec Charter and applied in the context of a regula-
tory board, it can be argued that a lack of separation between 
these functions can raise a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
Th erefore, great caution should be exercised when qualifying 
a process, especially one followed by a purely adjudicative 
tribunal. In the case of the RPD, the word “inquisitorial” to 
qualify the process should be clearly banished.
As for the qualifi cation of non-adversarial, it is accurate 
but it only highlights the fact of no opposite party to contest 
the claim. My view is that the emphasis should be put on 
what truly distinguishes the RPD process from other pro-
cesses generally followed by purely adjudicative tribunals: its 
power to inquire into a claim.
In fact, the RPD process sits between the inquisitorial 
and the adversarial processes. On the one hand, the claimant 
takes the initiative to introduce the instance and participate 
in the gathering of facts. On the other hand, Board mem-
bers are responsible for the direction of the process (which 
is notably highlighted by Guideline 7), but they also gather 
facts and assemble the evidence. For these reasons, I propose 
to qualify the RPD process as “investigative.”73
Th is being said, however, it does not resolve the issue as 
to the proper interpretation of the scope of the power to in-
quire. It is precisely the scope of this power resting on RPD 
members’ shoulders that is less clear. In other words, every-
body agrees that the RPD has some active role to play in the 
proceedings, but the question is: what is exactly the scope of 
the inquiry power conferred on a decision maker acting in a 
purely adjudicative tribunal such as the RPD? In my research 
for some guidance on this point, I found two possible mean-
ings.
In Quebec, the Administrative Justice Act sets the general 
procedural regime applicable to decisions made by boards 
exercising an adjudicative function. It enables decision mak-
ers to take measures to circumscribe the issues.74 Before the 
hearing, a board can call a case management conference or 
a pre-hearing conference in view of reaching an agreement 
with the parties on the direction of the instance. Issues such 
as the following can be determined through such agreement: 
defi ning the questions to be dealt with at the hearing, de-
termining how the conduct of the proceeding may be sim-
plifi ed or accelerated and the hearing shortened, examin-
ing the possibility for the parties of admitting certain facts 
or of proving them by means of sworn statements. Th is is 
also what Guideline 7 entitles RPD members to do, but with 
a signifi cant diff erence. Recall that the IRB states in the 
Guideline that the power to inquire means that members 
can defi ne what issues must be resolved in order for them to 
render a decision. A decision maker in charge of a case can 
determine alone what the issues are in a given case. He does 
have to reach an agreement with the claimant on this point. 
Indeed, even if the claimant or her representative can “notify 
the RPD as soon as possible of any issue it wants to add or 
delete, and explain why,”75 the decision maker does not have 
to agree with the content of the notifi cation. He “can add or 
delete issues even during the course of the hearing.”76
Th erefore, the question becomes whether the explicit 
grant of a power to inquire to RPD members means that the 
IRB can go as far entitling them to decide alone what the 
issues at stake are. In other words, the question comes down 
to the participatory right of refugee claimants. Do they have 
a right to determine with the IRB members the issues at stake 
pertaining to their claim? What would be the legal founda-
tion of such a right (the IRPA, explicitly or implicitly, or the 
common law)?
My intention is not to answer these questions in this paper 
for it would require a lengthy analysis. Indeed, a proper analy-
sis of the factors set in the Baker case would need to be con-
ducted fi rst.77 Further, in-depth research on the scope and 
limit of the right to an oral hearing and the right to present 
evidence, inter alia, which are granted to refugee claimants in 
the IRPA,78 would be clearly relevant to such an analysis. Of 
course, this analysis would also need to be contextualized by 
taking into account the specifi c environment of the refugee 
determination process, being shaped by statute, regulations, 
and the relevant policies of the IRB applicable to the Refugee 
Protection Division to fi x a given problem.79
Conclusion
In this paper, I have proposed an examination of the scope 
and limits of the doctrine of fettering discretion to assess 
the validity of guidelines. As currently applied, this doc-
trine does not provide a deep and nuanced understanding 
of the multi-faceted functions of guidelines and other policy 
instruments used by public authorities in contemporary ad-
ministrative law. Courts have focused their inquiry on the 
mandatory character of the guideline. When facing substan-
tive guidelines, this framework of analysis reveals important 
problems with them. However, when applied to procedural 
guidelines, this type of inquiry is not as useful because these 
guidelines, just as procedural rules, are not generally meant 
to be mandatory.
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My proposal is that the focus of the inquiry into the valid-
ity of a procedural guideline should be fi rst on its compat-
ibility with the decision making process established by stat-
ute, and in particular, with the procedural duties and powers 
granted to board members. In sum, the real issues are wheth-
er a guideline violates (1) the participatory rights of a claim-
ant to a process or (2) the duty of Board members to decide 
independently and impartially.
Starting with the second ground (bias), the doctrine of 
“fettering the independence and impartiality” of board mem-
bers, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Consolidated-
Bathurst, Tremblay and Ellis Don, and the Federal Court of 
Appeal in Th amotharem and Benitez, may be more or less 
relevant depending on the purpose of a procedural guide-
line. Indeed, procedural guidelines do not necessarily infl u-
ence decision makers when they exercise their adjudicative 
function. Admittedly, those aiming at fostering substantive 
consistency (“treat like cases alike”) of decisions do; those 
aiming at fostering procedural expediency (“justice delayed, 
justice denied”) do not.
In the case of a guideline aiming at fostering procedural 
expediency, such as in Guideline 7, the examination of the 
eff ect of the guideline on the participatory rights of a claim-
ant may prove to shed a more revealing light on the problems 
they may raise. In this case, it may be particularly relevant to 
ask oneself whether the guideline merely delimits (confi nes 
and structures) the procedural duties and powers of an ad-
ministrative tribunal, or if it goes further and transforms the 
process, as the Canadian Council for Refugees submitted. In 
the future, courts could be asked to examine the issue as to 
whether claimants for refugee status have a right to defi ne 
the issues at stake in their case and, if yes, whether Guideline 
7, especially in light of the IRB case management system,80 
violates their participatory rights to the procedure.
Finally, closer attention should be paid to guidelines 
issued to enhance expediency of a decision making process. 
Th is type of guideline may pose a higher risk of violating the 
participatory right to the procedure than any other guide-
line (nature or purpose). In the case of a tribunal such as the 
IRB, the government of the day can exercise great pressure 
so that it increases the speed of its decisions to eliminate or 
reduce signifi cantly a backlog for example. Th is goal is not in 
itself problematic: long delays in determining cases engen-
der undesirable eff ects on the rights and interests of people 
as well as the legitimacy of a public institution. However, it 
remains a basic tenet of our legal system that expeditiousness 
should not overcome fairness. To keep this balance is crucial 
to maintain legitimacy and credibility of any decision mak-
ing process.
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